Moldovskaya Respublika in Moldova (PMR); the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, both in Georgia; and the Republic of NagornoKarabakh (NKR) in Azerbaijan. On 2 September 2006, the Republic of NagornoKarabakh celebrated its fifteenth anniversary as a separate state with the presence of, among others, visiting guests from the other three unrecognised states.2 Few other state leaders, however, bothered to come. Recognised states and unrecognised states do not play together.
In this article we will set aside the thorny legal and moral issues of whether the victors of the post-Soviet secessionist wars ought to be rewarded with international recognition.3 Instead, we focus on whether the three quasi-states of the South Caucasus may be said to exist as functioning state entities.4 To what extent are the authorities able to provide the populace with the services expected of contemporary states, such as internal and external security, basic infrastructure, and welfare? Next, we note that all these putative states go one step further in their claims: they insist that they are not merely functioning states, but indeed nation-states that command the loyalty and allegiance of their population. We will thus discuss not only whether these quasi-states may be said to possess real 'stateness', but also their claim to embody real nationhood.5
In accordance with the terminology we have used in earlier studies (Kolstø 2000; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2004, pp. 8 -10) , we define state-building as the establishment of the administrative, economic, and military groundwork of functional states. It includes the establishment of frontier control, securing a monopoly of coercive powers on the state territory, and putting into place a system for the collection of taxes and tolls. These are the 'hard' aspects of state construction, as it were. By contrast, nationbuilding concerns the 'softer' aspects of state consolidation, such as the construction of a shared identity and a sense of unity in a state's population, through education, propaganda, ideology, and state symbols. Such 'nation-building' is a process actively pursued by state leaders, intellectuals, educators, and others who try to give a state the qualities of a nation-state. Nation-building is intended to instil in the population a sense of being one common nation, to cultivate a sense of belonging to the particular state in which they live and no other. Very often this policy includes elements of cultural and linguistic homogenisation, as well as popular participation in political institutions and processes.
In the modern world, statehood and nationhood are intimately related. If the citizens identify with the state they live in it will be much easier to get them to defend it 2NKR is the oldest of the South Caucasian quasi-states. South Ossetia formally declared its independence on 29 May 1992 and Abkhazia on 23 July 1992.
3For such discussions, see e.g. Public International Law and Policy Group (2000) , Potier (2001) , Bahcheli et al. (2004) , and Baran and de Waal (2006) . 4The fourth remaining post-Soviet quasi-state, PMR, is discussed in Kolstø et al. (1993) and Kolstø and Malgin (1998) . 5An interesting aspect of the existence of quasi-states is the role played by patron states. These are, in most cases, crucial for the very emergence as well as the continued survival of the quasi-states. As we want to focus on how the processes of state-building and nation-building are being implemented within the quasi-states, a discussion of the role of the quasi-state in the policies of the patron state (e.g. the role of Abkhazia in Russia's policy towards Georgia) nevertheless falls outside the scope of this article.
in times of war and crises, to make them pay their taxes, and in general to contribute to the common weal. Conversely, the populace will be far more prone to attach their identity and loyalty to the state if they feel that they get something in return-in security and other benefits and goods. In this article, then, we treat nationhood not as a normative term but as a quality that strengthens the quasi-states' chances for survival. In the following, we present a comparative analysis of the above-mentioned aspects of state-building and nation-building in the South Caucasian quasi-states.
Under the heading of 'state-building' we first look at the quasi-state's capacity for defence and control over borders and territory, and next, at economic performance as an indicator of the state's ability to provide welfare and infrastructure. Under the caption 'nation-building' we discuss nationhood in terms of both demos and ethnos. By this we mean that the inhabitants of a state can identify with it both through participation in democratic, political processes, and through a feeling of cultural and ethnic belonging. The policies adopted by the quasi-states may serve to strengthen or weaken either of those aspects. First, however, we discuss the historical background to the secessionist conflicts.
The historical roots Abkhazia
In the early nineteenth century, the Russian Empire began penetrating the current territory of Abkhazia, which was then under Ottoman rule. Present-day Sukhumi was subjugated in 1810, and the rest of the territory was acquired in piecemeal fashion over the next few decades. Not until 1864, however, did the Russians depose the local Shervashidze dynasty and abolish the internal autonomy of the principality. After the 1917 Revolution, the Abkhaz people again regained autonomy, this time in the form of a union republic within the new Soviet Union. In 1931, however, Abkhazia found itself demoted to the status of an autonomous republic and incorporated in the Georgian Union Republic, a status it was to retain until the break-up of the Soviet Union.6
The ethnic Abkhaz speak a language belonging to the northwest Caucasian language family. They adopted Christianity at an early stage, but quite a few were converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. Most Muslim Abkhaz were forced to migrate to Turkey in the late nineteenth century. Even so, according to the 1886 census the Abkhaz still made up 85% of the population of the region.7 However, as a result of an active Soviet migration policy, by the last Soviet census (1989) the Abkhaz proportion of the population had diminished to a mere 17.8% while the Georgian share had risen to 45.7%. Other important ethnic minorities were the Armenians (14.6%), Russians 6For a thorough, albeit clearly pro-Abkhaz, version of Abkhaz history, see Hewitt (1999) . A more balanced presentation is given in Coppieters et al. (1998). 7This figure is disputed, as it includes the so-called samurzakans. Other sources give a lower share of Abkhaz. According to www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html (accessed 3 November 2007), the Abkhaz constituted only 27.8% of the population in 1926.
(14.3%), and Greeks (2.8%) (Natsional'nyi sostav 1991) . The total population of Abkhazia at the time of this census was 525,000.
Discriminatory policy during the Stalin years, demographic pressure, and not least the potential prospect of Georgian secession from the Soviet Union, fuelled Abkhaz nationalism during the perestroika years. In February 1992, the Georgian authorities restored the 1921 pre-Soviet Constitution. In Abkhazia this was perceived as an attack on Abkhazia's autonomous status. In response, on 23 July 1992 the Abkhaz authorities declared independence.8 The Georgian authorities dispatched troops to restore order and the Abkhaz forces were pushed back. Soon, however, the Abkhaz troops were reinforced by numerous volunteers from Russia (in particular from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus). In September 1993, Sukhumi was recaptured, and the Georgian forces were put on the defensive. Most of the ethnic Georgian population fled the republic with the retreating army. In December 1993, a ceasefire agreement was signed, and the Abkhaz authorities began building a state and a nation out of their still-unrecognised republic.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR)-or Artsakh, as the region is often called by the local Armenian population-is geographically based on the autonomous oblast' Nagorno-Karabakh has traditionally been populated by two ethnic groups, the Christian Apostolic Armenians (speaking a language that constitutes a separate subbranch of the Indo-European family) and the Muslim, Turkic-speaking Azeris. The relative balance between these groups throughout history is disputed. While Armenians claim a strong historic presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azeri historians say that the region was predominantly Muslim until the nineteenth century, when the Russian Empire settled Armenian immigrants from the Ottoman Empire and Persia in Nagorno-Karabakh. The first Soviet census, conducted three years after the oblast' had been established, showed that 89.1% of the population was Armenian and 10.1%
Azeri. Throughout the Soviet period, the proportion of Armenians gradually declined 8With reference to Georgia's reintroduction of the 1921 Constitution, the Abkhaz authorities restored their 1925 Constitution. According to the latter, Abkhazia and Georgia were equal partners under a common union superstructure.
9The historical writing of Nagorno-Karabakh has, as in the case of the other South Caucasian quasistates, been highly politicised. Armenian and Azeri historians have widely differing interpretations of how far the region displayed Armenian or Azeri characteristics. For an account of the history of the Armenian population in the South Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, see Herzig and Kurkchiyan (2005) . to 76.9% by 1989, whereas the Azeri share had more than doubled, to 21.5% by 1989 (Natsional'nyi sostav 1991) . In the late Soviet period, the total population of the oblast' stood at 189,000.
In the late 1980s, the Karabakh question became a major issue not only in the region itself, but also in the Armenian Union Republic. On 20 February 1988, Armenian deputies in the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast' Soviet voted in favour of a merger with the Armenian Union republic. Clashes both in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan proper followed (most notably the Sumgait pogrom), resulting in a mass exodus of Armenians from Azerbaijan and Azeris from Armenia. In January 1990, the Soviet authorities responded by dissolving the oblast' Soviet and placing NagornoKarabakh under the direct control of Moscow. This did not, however, redress the grievances of the Karabakhi Armenians, and on 2 September 1991, oblast' authorities declared the establishment of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.10 On 21 November 1991, with the Soviet Union falling apart, Baku rescinded Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomy. Stepanakert (now officially renamed Khankendi by the Azerbaijani authorities) responded on 10 December 1991 with a referendum in which the Armenian population voted 'yes' to independence. The referendum was boycotted by the Azeri minority. In the following months, communal clashes developed into a bloody civil war. Even though the Azerbaijani side initially commanded more men and heavy weaponry, the Armenians beat back the attacks and even conquered vast tracts of undisputedly Azerbaijani territory before a ceasefire was concluded in May 1994, turning the war into a 'frozen conflict'.
South Ossetia
As regards the current South Ossetian quasi-state, it has its immediate historic roots in the South Ossetian Autonomous oblast' that was set up by the Soviet authorities in 1922 to cater for the political and cultural needs of those Ossetians who lived in the southern foothills of the Caucasus mountains. The Ossetians are predominantly Christian and speak a language belonging to the Iranian group within the larger IndoEuropean language family. Toward the end of the Soviet period, no more than 10.9% of the almost 600,000
Ossetians in the Soviet Union were living in the South Ossetian Autonomous oblast', whereas a full 56% lived in the adjacent North Ossetian Autonomous Republic. By 1989, there were more Ossetians in Georgia living outside their titular territory (99,000) than within the oblast' (65,000). The oblast' itself included several Georgian and mixed Ossetian -Georgian villages, especially in the Tskhinvali region and the eastern part of the territory.
According to the 1989 census, Ossetians made up 66%, Georgians 29% and Russians 2% of the population (Natsional'nyi sostav 1991) .
The level of interaction and intermarriage between Ossetians and Georgians was relatively high throughout most of the Soviet period. The national euphoria that swept the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, however, sparked new tensions. In November 1989, FIGURE 1. MAP SHOWING SOUTH OSSETIA as Georgia was gradually pulling away from the Soviet Union, the oblast' authorities decided to unilaterally declare South Ossetia an autonomous republic and to unite with North Ossetia. The Georgian authorities declared this move unconstitutional; later the same month, the first clashes between Ossetians and Georgians took place in Tskhinvali. In September 1990, the South Ossetian parliament adopted a declaration on sovereignty and on republican status. Having boycotted the Georgian elections in October,11 Tskhinvali organised its own parliamentary elections in December. The response from Tbilisi was harsh: on 11 December, South Ossetian autonomy was abolished, and in early January 1991 national-guard and police units were dispatched to the breakaway region to restore order. This led to a protracted secessionist war that lasted until June 1992. On 29 May 1992, shortly before the ceasefire agreement was signed, the South Ossetian parliament adopted a declaration of independence and a new post-Soviet quasistate came into being.
State-building: defence and control over borders and territory
The most fundamental aspect of state-building involves establishing physical control over the territory of the state-to-be. Abkhazia won the war in 1993, but still lacks control over parts of the territory to which it lays claim. The Kodori Gorge in northeastern Abkhazia has not been under Abkhaz control since the war, although Georgian control has been precarious as well. Instead, the local Svans under the 11These elections brought the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia to power in Georgia proper. leadership of warlord Emzar Kvitsani more or less ruled themselves for several years without interference from Tbilisi, aided by a 'gentlemen's agreement' with Sukhumi that the Svans would stay out of the Abkhaz -Georgian conflict (Chamagua 2006 Unlike the case of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) has control over virtually all the territory the republic lays claim to. The main exception is the Shahumanyan region in the north, which was not part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast' in Soviet times, but had a predominantly Armenian population.14 On the other hand, NKR has occupied a huge chunk of undisputedly Azerbaijani territory. This includes the strategically vital Lachin Corridor, a small strip of land that used to separate Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, as well as vast territories to the west There is no traffic whatsoever across the ceasefire line.
The army has a much higher profile and visibility in NKR society than in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With 15,000 -20,000 men under arms, the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army also has by far the largest army of the three secessionist states.16 In terms of state-building and nation-building this is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, without the army the state would not have existed: it is, as stated in official publications, 'the most basic guarantee for NKR's independence and one of the most important achievements of the Artsakh liberation struggle' (Nagorno-Karabakhskaya 2006, p. 41) . On the other hand, there is also the risk that the army might get out of control and threaten the development towards democracy and a state governed by the rule of law. A case in point is the story of war hero, Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief Samvel Babayan, who rose to prominence during the independence struggle. After the war, Babayan was granted considerable power and 14The Armenian population fled during the war, and the region now forms a part of the Azerbaijani Goranboy region.
15Settlers are offered cattle, building subsidies, subsidised utilities and tax breaks by the NKR government.
16Moreover, unlike the other secessionist armies, the NK army is well-integrated with a regular army (the Armenian), which is a great advantage when it comes to purchasing military materiel. In sharp contrast to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the border between South Ossetia and Georgia remained quite permeable throughout much of the post-Soviet period, with people moving back and forth relatively freely. Tskhinvali residents could go shopping in Gori, the closest city on the Georgian side; Georgians could visit relatives in South Ossetia. These contacts meant that tensions remained generally low, and in the 1990s the South Ossetian conflict was regarded as being 'close to solution'-in sharp contrast to the two other conflicts discussed here (Malysheva 1996, p. 35) .
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and South Ossetian President Lyudvig
Chibirov met several times, and many practical and economic problems were sorted out in this period. As for internal control over territory, the government has only gradually been able to assert its authority. In the aftermath of the 1991 -1992 war, former combatants showed little respect for the law or for civilian authorities. Clan structures, most notably the Tedeev brothers, challenged-and interacted with-state structures. In recent years, however, the situation is said to have improved.20
Economy and social conditions
The second aspect of state-building that we want to explore is the ability of the quasistate to collect taxes and tolls and to provide social security for its population. The war of 1992 -1993 left Abkhazia thoroughly devastated. This is a fact not only acknowledged by the Abkhaz authorities but also actively used in propaganda:
During the Soviet times, Abkhazia was one of the most prosperous regions of the former Soviet Union. . . . Today, the country produces a grim picture. The lush nature cannot conceal burned and destroyed houses, schools and kindergartens, looted factories, blown-up bridges, roads and tunnels. The majority of the enterprises are at a standstill now. Many plants are destroyed. For the rest, there are no supplies of raw materials, and no cash to pay the workers' salaries . . . The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1994 was US$60.3 mln, which, compared with 692.5 mln in 1988, makes up only 14% of the prewar level. (Chirikba nd) The blame for this is put on Georgian looting and wanton destruction during the war-in other words, the misery is not seen as reflecting Abkhaz state-building capacity as such. The description nevertheless gives rise to the question of how this situation can be squared with the claim that Abkhazia is already a functioning state.
The source of the quotation above-a text posted on the Internet in the mid-1990s-presents the viability of the Abkhaz state in terms of future prospects and possibilities:
Given its natural wealth, important strategic position, and active and enterprising population, one can positively assess the perspectives for dynamic economic development.
The numerous Abkhazian diaspora communities all over the world will undoubtedly also contribute to the economic recovery and prosperity of Abkhazia. (Chirikba nd) How does this look from the vantage point of 2007? The Russian economic blocade imposed in December 1994 (on Georgian insistence) was lifted in 1999, and the economy is clearly recovering, although slowly.21 While the state budget in 2004 was no more than R447 million, or e 13 million (Zakon 2004, p. 52) , it has more than doubled over the past three years to R1.2 billion (e 35 million) in 2007.22 This is still, of course, extraordinarily small. The government has embarked upon structural reforms.
The necessary legislation has been adopted to enable privatisation of small and medium-sized firms, whereas larger firms have been privatised in a more ad hoc 20Authors' interview with independent journalist Inga Kochieva, correspondent of Kavkazskii uzel, Tskhinvali, 15 September 2006. 21A CIS blockade imposed in January 1996 is still officially in force.
22Ekonomika, available at: www.apsny.ru/economic/economic.php?, accessed 15 January 2007.
manner-which has led to accusations of cronyism. Income tax is low, around 10%, and basic communal services are cheap or free.23 A certain negative reciprocity and mutual understanding developed in state -society relations in the first chaotic years after the war: the state does little for the population, and the population does little for the state. These attitudes are only slowly being improved.24
Nevertheless, the overall picture would seem to be one of gradual improvement: 'We started with half a loaf of bread, then one loaf of bread. If the average monthly salary in 1997 was 300 roubles, today it is 10 times as high'.25 However, even R3,000 per month, the equivalent of e 87, is still far from sufficient to ensure a decent living.
Galust Trapizonian, chairman of the parliamentary committee on social issues, admits that approximately 40% of the population are living on incomes beneath the official subsistence level (prozhitochnyi minimum).26 For pensioners, the situation is particularly dire: they would have lived in utter destitution had it not been for Russian assistance. According to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Maksim Gvindzhia, roughly 80% of the population hold dual Abkhaz -Russian citizenship,27
and are therefore also entitled to a Russian pension. In 2006, the minimum pension for Russian citizens was R1,160, as compared to an Abkhaz minimum pension of R100.
At the time, some 28,000 Abkhaz pensioners were eligible for this additional Russian pension.28 Having R1,260 and not R100 per month to live on makes all the difference in the world.
This 'solution' to a grave social problem, however, points to a serious problem of statehood. The Abkhaz state is not able to provide its citizens with the preconditions for an adequate livelihood and has to rely on a neigbouring state to provide basic services. This point is indirectly conceded by the Abkhaz authorities themselves.
According to Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba, Abkhazia is a 'Russian protectorate', but, he hastens to add, 'just like Georgia is an American protectorate'.29
In any case, Shamba avers, living conditions in Georgia are far worse than in Abkhazia. Those Westerners who visit only Tbilisi may perhaps be led to believe otherwise, but the poverty in Georgian villages, he maintains, is appalling. If Abkhazia is a protectorate of Russia, it is also a dependency of the international community of relief organisations. According to Dov Lynch (2004, p. 84) average. The Red Cross pays its local employees in Abkhazia twice as much as they would earn in a comparable job outside the international sector, while those working for the UN earn up to four or five times as much.30
The government is thus still not able to fulfil its obligations toward the population without relying heavily on external support and infrastructure, first and foremost from Russia. A particularly serious problem is posed by the reluctance of Abkhaz students who study abroad to return home afterwards. Of some 600 young people who have completed their studies in Russia in recent years, only 27% have returned. The Abkhaz authorities try to appeal to their sense of duty to the fatherland, but the students complain about low salaries and the impossibility of finding jobs for which they are qualified. Sometimes, they claim, the jobs they might want are given to less qualified people with the right family connections. To combat this difficulty, the Abkhaz authorities have threatened to instruct Russian educational institutions that accept Abkhaz students not to provide a graduation diploma unless they return home (Shul'gina 2006) . This tactic may help in the short run but will be self-defeating in the long run, as it undercuts the very patriotism to which the Abkhaz state otherwise seeks to appeal.
In Nagorno-Karabakh the war lasted longer and took a heavier toll of lives than the Stepanakert is today almost completely rebuilt. Remote villages, however, often present a far bleaker picture. Much of the credit for the more rapid recovery in Nagorno-Karabakh goes to the Armenian diaspora, which has contributed substantial help, not least in infrastructure. The old road between Nagorno-Karabakh and Goris in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh's lifeline, has received very substantial repairs and improvements in recent years, making it one of the best roads in the region. It symbolically links together not only Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia but also Nagorno-Karabakh and the diaspora, as signs along the road tell which sector has been sponsored by which donors.32 In fact, this is much more than symbolism: after the closure of Stepanakert airport in 1990, this road has become the sole link between Nagorno-Karabakh and the outside world.
While the Nagorno-Karabakhi authorities readily acknowledge the crucial contribution of the diaspora in the republic's economy, they also underscore the role played by their own economic policy. NKR opted early on for privatisation, price liberalisation, and a general transition to a market economy. Today all small and medium-size enterprises have been privatised, and the privatisation of larger enterprises continues. Investors pay only 5% tax on profit, and foreign investment 30A third potential source of economic relief for Abkhazia is, as pointed out by Chirikba above, the ethnic Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey. During the blockade in the 1990s Turkey looked the other way while its citizens, primarily those with Abkhaz ethnic roots, provided aid and trade to the quasi-state.
The once-high hopes for a vigorous resuscitation of links with the diaspora have nevertheless been in vain (Ivanova 2006) . 31The exact number of casualties is disputed, but most sources place the figure in the range of 25,000 -30,000. 32Likewise, the diaspora has funded the construction of the new 1,700-km-long North -South 'Backbone' Highway. is encouraged.33 Initially, the privatisation programme encountered numerous difficulties, especially with the privatisation of land (Ayrapetyan 2006, p. 83) , but the policy has nevertheless paid off. Diaspora Armenians have invested both in the labour-intensive carpet industry and the large Drmbon gold and copper mine, which was reopened in 2003. The government has also been able to curb the initially high inflation and has achieved macro-economic stabilisation.
NKR had a serious problem with its shadow economy in the first years after independence. The rampant smuggling that has developed into a cornerstone enterprise in many other non-recognised states has, however, had no chance to develop in NKR, for a very practical reason.34 Geographically, NKR is at a dead end, and the smuggling routes from Iran to Russia bypass it. This has contributed to a 34In Kolstø (2006, p. 752) , it was stated: 'In the NKR the inhabitants eke out a living by smuggling, drug traffic, and selling timber to Iran and other countries'. However, this assertion has not been proven and may have been based on insufficient and slanted information. certainly more so than Stepanakert, but this is due more to lack of maintenance than lack of reconstruction. The townscape clearly reflects the poor state of the South Ossetian economy. Industry in the republic was designed for the Soviet market and when that collapsed most factories had to close. Unlike the situation in Abkhazia and in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, the authorities have been more reluctant to embark upon structural reform. No full-scale privatisation of the economy has taken place. The reason is said to be that the Ossetians do not want to sell their resources for a pittance, and as long as their state is not recognised, any bids at privatisation auctions are bound to be low.40
Another reason why the South Ossetians have been less inclined towards reform may be the huge profits made on transit trade from Russia to Georgia.41 There are only two roads across the mountains between these two countries, and the best one passes through South Ossetia.42 The Georgian side has regarded this business as smuggling. South Ossetian spokespersons, however, deny this charge on the grounds that customs are paid to both Russia and South Ossetia.43 In any case, Georgia allowed this trade for a long time without interfering and a huge market operated at the Ergneti border crossing. In 2004, however, the Georgian authorities, inspired by the success in reintegrating the semi-independent Ajara region, decided to step up the pressure on South Ossetia, and closed down this mainstay of the local economy. 41This trade also generated considerable corruption on the Ossetian as well as on the Georgian and Russian sides, and with it, vested interests in the perpetuation of the status quo (Cornell 2003) . 42North and South Ossetia are linked by the Roki Tunnel, whereas the Verkhnii Lars border crossing on the old 'Georgian Military Road' from Vladikavkaz to Tbilisi is more exposed to harsh winter conditions. Economic hardship is also reflected elsewhere in the social sector: both healthcare and the education system suffer greatly from the lack of investment. The few international organisations operating in South Ossetia deal mainly with refugees and have not contributed significantly to the development of the republic as such.49 As in the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia has to draw on Russian infrastructure to meet the basic needs of its people.
Nation-building: ethnos and demos
Under the heading of nation-building, we will, as mentioned above, examine the different quasi-states' policies aimed at strengthening the population's identification with the ethnos (through stimulating the feeling of cultural and ethnic belonging) as well as the demos (through participation in democratic, political processes).
In Abkhazia, as in most other post-Soviet states (Kolstø 2000) , the nationhood concept incorporates a tension between an ethnic and a civic understanding of the nation. The constitution, on the one hand, states that 'the sovereignty bearer and sole source of authority in the Republic of Abkhazia shall be its people, the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia' (Article 2)-and yet, the president is required to be an give a population of 137,000, which is approximately the size of the non-Azeri population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast' in 1989. Deputy Prime Minister Ararat Danielian has nevertheless admitted the need to design policies to boost fertility rates. As much as 25% of the population, or 32,000 individuals, are beyond retirement age.61 The NKR authorities also actively encourage immigration, and government spokespersons claim that NKR today is experiencing a positive migration balance. There has been some in-migration from recession-hit Armenian towns and some from the overseas diaspora, but mostly it is a case of Nagorno-Karabakhis who went to Russia to try their luck but, with Moscow tightening its immigration regime, have had to return.
Unlike Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh today has a population that is almost completely homogeneous in ethnic terms. The fact that the entire Azeri pre-war population has fled and lives as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan may have created a huge obstacle to peace settlement and international recognition, but, cynically speaking, it is an asset in the nation-building process: there are no deep ethnic or religious cleavages among the NKR population today.62
Deep ambiguity clouds the ultimate goal of Nagorno-Karabakhi nation-building, however. On the one hand, it is clearly stated that the foremost aim of NKR foreign policy is to achieve international recognition as an independent state. On the other hand, no claim has ever been made that there exists an independent NagornoKarabakhi nation. On the contrary, the people of NKR are said to be Armenians, 62In NKR, the moral, political, and legal issues of the IDP issue is always linked to the question of Armenian refugees from other parts of Azerbaijan to Armenia. pure and simple: 'It is impossible to talk about a Karabakhi culture, education, or science as separate phenomena; they are all integral parts of an all-Armenian cultural, educational and scientific system'.63 The Nagorno-Karabakhi experience has been pivotal in transforming the consciousness of Armenians-not only in NKR, but everywhere-from a self-understanding based on victimisation (after the 1918 massacre) to one based on self-defence and victory. Thus, the Nagorno-Karabakhis in a sense do regard themselves as different, but only in a way that links them intimately with the greater Armenian nation: 'Karabakh is the national idea of Armenia'.64 As a result of this ambiguity, NKR has pursued an inconsistent policy of nation-building. Some elements of symbolic nation-building have been promoted, others neglected. There are, for instance, separate NKR postal stamps, but no separate currency; instead, NKR uses Armenian drams. The Nagorno-Karabakh flag reflects this ambiguity. It is a tricolour with the same colours as the Armenian flag, but on the right-hand side a zigzag-shaped piece has been cut off and is placed at a distance. The piece gives associations to tapestry and traditional Nagorno-Karabakhi handicraft, but more importantly, if given a slight 'push' to the left, it will fit perfectly in with the rest-and replicate the Armenian flag.
Another result of the above-noted ambiguity was the long delay in adopting a Thus, NKR has never experienced a turnover of power such as Abkhazia has.
Parliamentary elections were held in 1991, 1995, 2000, and 2005 . In the first three elections the electoral system was purely majoritarian, while in 2005 a mixed system was introduced and one third of the seats were filled by party lists. This change did not, however, strengthen party representation in the parliament: whereas almost one third of the seats in the outgoing parliament were controlled by the vocal opposition Independent statehood is seen as merely a means to this end, and will gladly be given up the moment it has been achieved. In symbolic nation-building this is illustrated by the fact that the flag and coat of arms of South Ossetia are identical to those of North Ossetia.
Since North Ossetia is a subject of the Russian Federation, reunification of Ossetia can take place only within the framework of this state. South Ossetia has several times appealed to the authorities in Moscow to clarify the procedures for being included in the Russian state. While waiting for an invitation to join, they pursue stepwise integration through contacts with local and regional leaders in Russia. One such 82At the same time, the notion that political allegiances in South Ossetia should follow almost exactly the tortuous line that separates Georgian and South Ossetian authorities is simply not credible, and the results of the double elections and double referenda clearly indicate that democratic standards on both sides leave something to be desired. sister parties in Russia, CPRF and United Russia. Although there are some differences between them, these do not extend to the question of independence: all South Ossetian political parties support secession. As regards civil society, this seems less developed than in the two other quasi-states examined here.
Conclusion: comparison of state-and nation-building capabilities
Barry Bartmann (2004, p. 15) argues that in the modern world the legitimacy of states consists of two aspects: on the one hand, viability and survivability, that is, the capacity to fulfil the functions of statehood; on the other, the 'right' to a separate destiny. Legitimacy, then, has both a practical and a moral aspect. Virtually all studies of quasi-states have focused on the latter. This article has been devoted to the former.
By virtue of continuing to exist one and a half decades after their unilateral secessions, the three quasi-states of the South Caucasus have demonstrated a capability to survive under adverse circumstances. Some observers have therefore concluded that they are quite strong.
The territorial separatists of the 1990s have become state-builders in the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field armies, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of the recognised states of which they are still notionally a part. (King 2001, p. 525) In contrast to this view, Dov Lynch sees the quasi-states as failing: 'They have the institutional fixtures of statehood, but they are not able to provide for its substance' (Lynch 2002, p. 841 ).
According to Kolstø (2006) , the modal tendency of unrecognised quasi-states is weak state-building, and some strong structural reasons were indicated why this should be the case. Firstly, the war for independence was in all cases fought mainly or exclusively on the territory of the breakaway region, and material damage was massive. Secondly, the war in many cases led to a criminalisation of the economy. As Espen Barth Eide (1999) has pointed out, While wars, blockades and exceptional situations are devastating for the majority, they create breeding ground for certain types of economic activity that proves particularly effective in the absence of order. The people that benefit from such activities see few reasons to support the re-establishment of effective public control.
Thirdly, quasi-states suffer from what Scott Pegg (1998, p. 43 ) has called 'the economic cost of non-recognition': the states from which they have seceded will often be able to impose an embargo on trade with the breakaway region, and foreign investors will be wary of dealing with the separatists, lest they find themselves barred from the normally larger market of the metropolitan state. Finally, since quasi-states are not officially recognised, no international conventions can be applied on their territory, and no effective monitoring by international organisations is possible. The resultant lack of transparency in these states can prove extremely attractive for criminal and other semilegal businesses.
Even so, on closer inspection we can detect clear differences in the state-building and nation-building capabilities of the three South Caucasian secessionist states. With regard to capacity for defence, border control, and control over territory, there is a clear hierarchy: Nagorno-Karabakh on top, Abkhazia in the middle and South Ossetia at the bottom. Also other aspects of 'hard' state-building-like economic development, the consolidation of state institutions, and the establishment of a permanent population-follow more or less the same order. To be sure, NKR until December 2006 lacked a constitution, whereas South Ossetia had adopted its constitution in 1993. However, much of the South Ossetian legislation was simply copied from Russian laws, with the word 'South Ossetia' substituted for 'Russia', as if by a 'search-and-replace' method. Tskhinvali has never given high priority to building a state, since the aim has been to join Russia as soon as possible.84 While Karabakhis also hope that their state will be a transient phenomenon, they have not neglected institution building to the same degree. Of the three cases examined here, the Abkhaz are perhaps most determined to establish a permanent independent state. According to some observers, no more than half of Abkhazia's population would wish to join Russia if they were given a choice, while the other half would opt to go it alone.85
With regard to ethnic and civil nation-building, we note that in all three quasi-states the moral and legal basis for secession is said to be the ethnic discrimination experienced in Georgia or Azerbaijan by the titular nationality. In all of them, the current demographic makeup is a result of forced migration through which the proportion of the titular nationality in the population has risen. Even so, in none of the states is there today a perfect match between the civic and the ethnic nation, as they define it. In Nagorno-Karabakh and in South Ossetia, the titular nation is an entity larger than the population of the breakaway republic, while in Abkhazia it is smaller. While the ethnic Abkhaz still do not constitute a majority in 'their' republic, this has not prevented the development of what appears to be a relatively vibrant democracy in Abkhazia. According to social philosophers such as John Stuart Mill (1859) and Robert Dahl (1971) , pluralistic democracy will develop more readily in homogeneous societies than in divided ones. We found that, of the three cases, Abkhazia exhibits the highest degree of openly expressed political diversity. In a statebuilding perspective, however, the strength of the Abkhaz democratic institutions cannot make up for the lack of the economic dynamism and ethnically-based unity shown by Nagorno-Karabakh.
If the hierarchy of state-building we have identified is correct, how can it best be explained? Clearly, size is not the determining factor: NKR has less than two thirds the population of the Republic of Abkhazia; South Ossetia, on the other hand, has about half the population of NKR. Also their former status in the hierarchy of Soviet national autonomous units does not seem to play a role. In the Soviet period, NKR and South Ossetia were merely autonomous oblasti, while Abkhazia enjoyed the status of autonomous republic. Also the avoidance of war destruction is a poor indicator of potential state-building. If anything, this factor stands in a reverse relationship to the hierarchy we believe to have observed. 84Mentioned in authors' interview with Inga Kochieva, correspondent of Kavkazskii uzel, Tskhinvali, 15 September 2006. 85Authors' interview with journalist Nadezhda Venediktova, Sukhumi, 6 September 2006. Among the factors that seem more important we find, firstly, the stance adopted by the challenger state. A strong and uncompromising challenger state facilitates independent state-building in the breakaway region, while a more accommodating attitude might impede it. The experience of South Ossetia is illustrative in this respect.
In the assessment of South Ossetian officials themselves, the low degree of tension on the South Ossetian -Georgian border under Shevardnadze had the effect of retarding South Ossetian state-building efforts. As long as the South Ossetians had numerous relatives in Georgia proper and could freely go and visit them, it proved extremely difficult to muster support for a policy that might lead to the complete severance of such ties.
Such experiences may go some way in explaining the intransigence of many quasistates in bilateral negotiations with the metropolitan state. Secessionists will be extremely wary of falling into what they see as an 'accommodation trap', a slippery slope that leads to gradual and imperceptible reintegration. There is, for instance, no doubt that reopening the railway connections from Russia to Armenia over Abkhaz and Georgian territory could greatly boost the struggling Abkhaz economy, and the Georgians are very much in favour-provided that these connections can run by them on Abkhaz territory as well. Negotiations for a reopening of the railroad have so far failed to produce concrete results, and the Abkhaz authorities declare that the moment Georgia insists on establishing its own customs control posts on Abkhaz territory, they will break off negotiations immediately (Dzhodzhua 2006, p. 3) . While this position might seem unyielding, the Abkhaz opposition nevertheless accuses the current administration of being dangerously cooperative and of 'putting economy before politics'. As evidence of this softness, they point to the fact that as a basis for the negotiations the Abkhaz side has accepted some maps of Abkhazia with Georgian toponyms (Troyanskii kon' 2006, p. 2) .
A second important factor is the role of the patron state. All three South Caucasian quasi-states enjoy the backing of and are heavily dependent on an external patron, but the degree of support varies. As patron of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian Federation has vacillated between the role of partisan supporter of one side in the conflict and that of an 'honest broker'. This has caused some apprehension among its clients. The Abkhaz Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly sees Abkhazia as a pawn in a greater Russian Caucasian game;86 and South Ossetian interviewees indicated that in case of renewed hostilities with Georgia they would be able to rely on wholehearted support only from North Ossetia,87 although this republic cannot fulfil the role of a serious external patron. By contrast, the Armenian backing of NKR is far more singleminded and consistent. Moreover, the NKR enjoys the support of a prosperous and generous overseas diaspora-an asset that the two other quasi-states cannot match. 
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